

SECRET

26 March 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: SA/DCI/IA
SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on START, 27 March 1984

1. You are scheduled to attend a National Security Council meeting tomorrow at 1400 hours in the Cabinet Room to discuss (no decisions) the status and prospects for major nuclear arms control negotiations, particularly INF and START. This will be a principal plus one meeting and [redacted] will be accompanying you.

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2. The SOVA paper at Tab A, that you have already seen, will serve as a centerpiece for the meeting.

3. Your talking points are at Tabs D & E. There are two versions here, one prepared by Fritz Ermarth and another prepared by [redacted] [redacted] has a second version of his talking points at Tab C, which is EYES ONLY.) Rather than melding the two together and boiling them down to the least common denominator, I thought it wiser to let you see both of them so that you can get a feel for the differences of view that are at play here. Fritz believes that the Soviets are unprepared to make the necessary concessions required for real movement in the major arms control arenas [redacted]

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[redacted] is more optimistic about the prospects for an agreement this year if the US wants one [redacted]

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4. Finally, I thought you might also find of interest the appended draft SOVA Monthly which provides a rundown of the major arms control negotiations. SOVA expects to publish this draft next month.

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5. If I can do more to help you prepare for this meeting, please call.

TAB X

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DDI 01904/84
ACIS 169/84
26 March 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: [REDACTED]
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting, 27 March

1. This memorandum transmits your briefing book for the NSC meeting now scheduled for 1400 on Tuesday, 27 March. [REDACTED]

2. The topics of this meeting began two or more weeks ago as trade offs and frameworks of the US START policy. A week ago at a meeting of the Senior Arms Control Policy Group (SACPG), Richard Perle made it clear that he thought the issue was not trade offs and the associated details, but rather US strategy in arms control between now and the first Tuesday in November. That idea was accepted by Mr. McFarlane. Consequently, the issue of START trade offs has been replaced by the two issues now on the table as stated by Mr. McFarlane:

- o Soviet interest in arms control in 1984.
- o US interests in 1984.

Last Thursday, Mr. McFarlane said this NSC meeting is intended for discussion, not decision. [REDACTED]

3. The paper on Soviet interests was written by SOVA analysts. In addition to the obvious evidence, this paper is based on two private chats we had with Amb. Jack Matlock, NSC Staff, and Dr. James Timbie, Special Assistant to Deputy Secretary of State Ken Dam. The session with Mr. Matlock dealt with his views on Soviet interests. The session with Dr. Timbie dealt with the Reagan-Chernomko correspondence, as well as the Eagleberger-Burt/Dobrynin-Sokolov talks in Washington and the Gromyko-Hartman talks in Moscow. The paper does not refer to such exchanges but the paper is congruent with our understandings of the contents of those exchanges. In any case, I think SOVA's paper is a good piece and the comments last Thursday of the SACPG participants indicate they agreed. [REDACTED]

(TAB A)

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DDI 01904/84
ACIS 169/84
26 March 1984

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting, 27 March

4. Attached (on left) is a Table of Contents tailored to these two issues. I am skeptical that the OSD paper on US strategy, written by Richard Perle but to be signed out to the President by Secretary Weinberger, will arrive before the meeting. I asked Mr. Perle for a copy. In any case, I expect that State Department, and perhaps ACDA, will write their own views of the second issue. I have asked that copies be made available to you, either through me or to you directly, but I doubt they will arrive too. [REDACTED]

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5. If there is anything more I may do to assist you on this subject, please call and let me know. [REDACTED]

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Attachment:
As stated

DDI 01904/84
ACIS 169/84
26 March 1984

SUBJECT: NSC/NSPG Meeting, 27 March

DDI/ACIS/ [] (23 Mar 84)

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

23 March 1984

Soviet Interest in Arms Control Negotiations in 1984

Summary

The Soviets appear to have adopted a two-pronged strategy on arms control, taking an inflexible line on INF and START, while simultaneously expressing willingness to move ahead on other security issues, and signaling that a breakthrough in US-Soviet relations is possible if Washington shows flexibility in these other areas. They presumably calculate that this strategy enables them to stand firm on the central issues of INF and START, without making themselves appear so intransigent as to rally support for NATO's policies or to demonstrate that they, not the Administration, are responsible for poor US-Soviet relations. Meanwhile, they continue to probe for US flexibility on a range of issues, with the aim of extracting the maximum price for any marked improvement in relations or arms control issues before the US elections. The Politburo will be wary of any major steps unless convinced that significant gains are at hand for the USSR, especially on their fundamental concerns in START and INF.

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This memorandum was prepared by [redacted] Strategic/Internal Branch, Current Support Division, Office of Soviet Analysis, with contributions from other SOVA analysts. Questions and comments should be addressed to the Chief, Current Support Division, [redacted]

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The Soviet Calculus

1. Two major considerations appear to be behind current Soviet policies on arms control and US-Soviet relations; the need to keep the deadlocked INF and START issues from seriously damaging the Soviet political position in Europe--including the effort to fan anti-INF sentiment--and calculations regarding the US election campaign. [REDACTED]

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2. The Soviets appear interested in a dialogue with the US that would end the spiraling deterioration in relations. Nonetheless, they have made it clear they are reluctant to do anything that would enhance the reelection prospects of the present Administration by enabling it to claim a major success in the area of US-Soviet relations. At the same time, they apparently believe that if they appear unyielding, the Administration will be able to lay the blame for poor relations on their doorstep and claim that its own attempts at a bilateral improvement have been rebuffed. Moreover, they appear not to have excluded the possibility of some kind of agreement at this time if convinced it would serve their interests. [REDACTED]

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3. The Soviets appear deeply pessimistic about the prospects for a significant US concession on START and INF, and probably are sensitive to the possibility that by suspending arms control talks and taking military countermeasures, they have made West Europeans less receptive to arguments that the breakdown in the East-West dialogue is due exclusively to US intransigence and belligerence. Moscow nevertheless may continue to hope that domestic pressures in the US, including electoral politics, and increased concern and pressure from Western Europe over the US-Soviet stalemate could prompt the US to alter its current stance to a position more acceptable to Moscow. [REDACTED]

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4. The Soviets already are trying to heighten these pressures through direct appeals to West European leaders, with whom Moscow has maintained close contact despite earlier warnings about the consequences of the first deployments. In private Soviet demarches at this level, as well as public commentary, they have sought to demonstrate popular opposition to INF, claimed that the US has spurned Soviet efforts to restore the East-West dialogue, and warned that deployment of US missiles subverts the sovereignty of West European countries as well as their "gains" from detente. Moscow might further try to court West European opinion by hinting at willingness to consider multilateral negotiations that would draw the British and French into direct discussion of INF and their own forces' role. It appears more likely at present, however, that the Soviets will try to gain credit by expanding upon their initiatives on non-INF issues in existing multilateral forums such as MBFR, the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, or the CDE. [REDACTED]

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5. The Soviets also will continue trying to cast the US in the villain's role by encouraging opposition leaders in the INF-

basing countries--particularly the Social Democrats in West Germany--to speak out forcefully against INF deployments. Further, Moscow has maintained and perhaps even raised the level of its direct and covert support to the West European peace movement. The Soviets may hope that the existence of deployed missiles--along with announced basing sites--will provide a focus for renewed demonstrations by the dispirited and divided movement. Moscow's efforts in this area probably will be tempered, however, by the concern to avoid the charge of manipulating the peace movement. In addition, it now must face the possibility that elements of the movement could direct their opposition activities against Warsaw Pact countermeasures. Moreover, Soviet exit from the negotiations makes it difficult for them to recapture the high ground in the contest for public opinion. [REDACTED]

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Intransigence on Resuming START and INF Talks

6. Following Chernenko's accession, a brief hiatus in the repetition of Moscow's demand that the INF missiles be withdrawn had suggested that the Soviets might be hinting at greater flexibility on resuming talks. There now have been several recent indications that Moscow has decided to maintain its firm line against resuming the Geneva negotiations. In a number of public statements, Soviet leaders have said they will not return to the Geneva talks unless the new US missiles are removed from Europe. In talks on 10-12 March with senior US arms control specialists in Moscow under the auspices of the Dartmouth Conference, as well as in Chernenko's talks on 13 March with visiting leaders of the West German Social Democratic Party, the Soviets also rejected the idea of merging the negotiations, some implying and others asserting outright that neither negotiation could resume unless NATO's new intermediate-range missiles were withdrawn from Western Europe. [REDACTED]

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7. Soviet officials at the Dartmouth Conference also dismissed as a solution to INF the "walk-in-the-woods" formula. By rejecting both the walk-in-the-woods formula and a merger, these officials seemed to be closing the door on two potential avenues which some Soviets had speculated as recently as January could lead to a revival of the talks. [REDACTED]

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8. Some Soviets have hinted that INF talks could resume this year if the US agreed to a moratorium in the INF deployment schedule and taking the UK and French systems into account somewhere in the arms control negotiations. The most recent statement to this effect was made in mid-March by a representative of the Institute for the USA and Canada at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, who said that INF talks could be resumed in 1984 if the US met these two conditions. A first secretary [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] also has suggested that the USSR would be more interested in resuming the INF talks if the US met these two conditions. He

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also raised the possibility of an INF negotiation involving the US, USSR, France, and the UK. [REDACTED]

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9. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin has taken a more upbeat stance on the prospects for strategic arms negotiations in discussions with correspondents than the general line would indicate. His statements clearly have been intended to portray the USSR, despite its tough public stance, as sincerely interested in movement, and thereby to put pressure on the Administration for greater flexibility. His remarks also probably reflect instructions to keep open a channel through which Moscow's hoped-for movement from the US side might be conveyed. [REDACTED]

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10. The Soviets almost certainly realize that they eventually must moderate their position if they are to limit NATO INF deployments and US strategic systems through resumed INF and START negotiations. However, while the Soviets hope to use negotiations to limit US strategic programs, their R & D programs provide them with the capability to compete with or without arms control agreements. Strategic offensive systems currently in development and flight-testing provide the Soviets with the basis for improving their strategic capabilities under SALT II Treaty limits or those of their START proposals, as well as in the absence of any arms control constraints. There is room under SALT II and the Soviet START position for their new MIRVed SLBM systems (the SS-N-20 and SS-NX-23), the ALCM-equipped Bear H and Blackjack heavy bombers, and the MIRVed SS-X-24 ICBM. Further, the claim by the Soviets that their single-RV SS-X-25 is a "modernized" SS-13 is intended to permit deployment of this system as well. While the Soviets at START have thus far insisted that long-range SLCMS and GLCMS be banned, they are testing such systems and are well-positioned to deploy them in the absence of a ban on them. [REDACTED]

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11. The Soviets have proposed talks for an agreement that would eliminate existing anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and ban testing and deployment of all space-based weapons. In addition, they have announced a moratorium on testing ASAT weapons in space, as long as the US refrains from such tests. Their immediate aim probably is to preclude the development and deployment of the US direct-ascent ASAT interceptor, while their longer term aim is to prevent the US from translating its technological capabilities into systems such as space-based lasers that could be used both for ASAT weapons and for ballistic missile defense. [REDACTED]

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Prospects for Progress on Other Issues

12. Chernenko seemed to imply in his speech of 2 March that an agreement on issues usually regarded as secondary-- particularly the banning of chemical weapons and the demilitarization of space--could prepare the way for a "dramatic breakthrough" in US-Soviet relations despite the impasse in START

and INF. The suggestion that it might be possible to bypass the most intractable issues and achieve progress elsewhere appears intended to improve the Soviet image as a proponent of arms control and reduced international tensions despite the USSR's continued refusal to return to Geneva. At the same time, the Soviets are probing for flexibility on a range of issues where progress would not necessarily require a reversal of fundamental US or Soviet positions. [REDACTED]

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13. The proposals Chernenko listed represent longstanding Soviet goals and public positions:

- US ratification of the treaties limiting underground nuclear weapons tests and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes;
- resumption of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty, suspended by the US;
- an agreement to limit weapons in outer space;
- US acceptance of a freeze on nuclear weapons; and
- an agreement to ban chemical weapons, where he said conditions for an accord are "beginning to ripen."

He hinted that the Soviets, who recently accepted the principle of continuous international monitoring of chemical weapons destruction sites, may be willing to make further moves on chemical weapons verification. He said that they favor an agreement under which there would be effective control of the "whole process of destruction--from beginning to end." [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] told the US delegation to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva that the Soviets are preparing to table a draft treaty to ban chemical weapons. [REDACTED]

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14. Soviet officials, particularly the Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, Vladimir Shustov, have indicated that the USSR attaches high priority to initiating "unofficial" talks with the US on limiting the deployment of weapons in outer space. A Central Committee staff member, Stanislav Menshikov, arrived in the US recently with the primary purpose [REDACTED] of helping organize such a conference. [REDACTED] Menshikov, [REDACTED] said that there is no need for the US and USSR to resolve differences on INF and START before engaging in a dialogue on other security issues, such as chemical warfare and space weaponry. [REDACTED]

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15. Chernenko's claim that a US-Soviet agreement on these issues could signal the start of a sharp improvement in bilateral relations suggests the Soviets might consider such an agreement as partial grounds for a meeting at the highest level. Soviet leaders have made a point of insisting, however, that it is up to

the US to act first. Moreover, Moscow may well hold out for a firm US commitment to at least negotiate on fundamental Soviet concerns in START and INF before agreeing to any dramatic bilateral gesture. The Soviets will be looking in particular for signals that the US is willing to consider major steps in accordance with Soviet objectives, such as:

- a freeze on further INF deployments, particularly Pershing IIs;
- an agreement to take into account UK and French systems; or
- an agreement to limit future deployment of US strategic systems the Soviets consider most threatening--SLCMs, ALCMs, MX, or the D-5 SLBM.

The Soviets have been ambiguous on the extent to which they hold progress in START dependent upon US concessions in INF. For now, it appears that they would refuse to resume the strategic negotiations unless satisfied that their central INF concerns would be addressed, but this line is doubtless intended in part to probe US willingness to make such concessions, and a definitive Soviet position is likely to emerge only in response to specific US initiatives. [REDACTED]

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16. Chernenko also suggested that progress could be made toward agreement on "norms" to govern relations between nuclear powers, particularly an agreement to hold urgent consultations in the event of a situation threatening nuclear war. This area would appear to include current US-Soviet negotiations to upgrade crisis communications and talks aimed at preventing a recurrence of the KAL shutdown. Chernenko, however, raised this possibility separately from those issues which he suggested could lead to a "breakthrough" in relations, perhaps to signal that agreement on this point would not be of comparable significance. [REDACTED]

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17. Chernenko made no reference on 2 March to the MBFR talks, and the Soviets appear to hold little expectation of an early breakthrough. A deputy director of the Institute for the USA and Canada said in late February that the Soviets would not have agreed to resume the talks had they been bilateral, a remark that suggests Moscow believes the principal advantage of the talks lies in the possibilities they offer for wedge-driving between the US and its allies. This view probably has been strengthened by Western press reports of differences between the US and West Germany over the Allied position. Even if the Western allies were to agree on softening their position regarding prior agreement on data, the Soviets would be unlikely to accept Western proposals on verification to the extent necessary for an early breakthrough in the talks. [REDACTED]

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18. Since the beginning of the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe, Soviet spokesmen have been stressing the importance of an agreement on the non-use of force as a step toward improving the climate of East-West relations. Chernenko, however, did not refer to this proposal, and although the Soviets appear to attach greater importance than the US to declaratory measures, it is doubtful that a moderation of US opposition on this point alone would evoke any response from them on more substantive issues. [REDACTED]

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
19. Soviet spokesmen have also listed a number of other issues where they claim that agreement by the West would lead to a significant lowering of international tensions. These include a pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, a nonaggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, an agreement to reduce military spending, and the establishment of nuclear-free zones, including northern Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean. The Soviets doubtless realize that these proposals, where they are not purely cosmetic, would require major strategic concessions by the West, and the proposals therefore appear largely rhetorical, rather than serious attempts to find common ground. By dint of repetition, however, they may have acquired some real significance in Soviet eyes, and it is possible that US willingness to consider the more innocuous among them could be part of a package to improve bilateral relations. [REDACTED]

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Uncertainties and Soviet Political Dynamics

20. While the ultimate authority for approving arms control policy rests with the Politburo, the formulation of key decisions in this area takes place in the Defense Council, a group of about half a dozen political and military leaders. Functioning as the Defense Council's executive secretariat, the General Staff--through its Main Operations Directorate--coordinates the flow of information to the Defense Council decisionmakers. This arrangement assures the military a highly influential role in the arms control policy-making process. Information and policy proposals are channeled through the General Staff from the Defense Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, the Military Industrial Commission, and specific Central Committee staffs, notably the International Department and International Information Department. [REDACTED]

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22. Evidence of current power relationships and individual views on arms control within the Politburo is admittedly sparse. We believe, however, that the strategy toward relations with the US suggested in Chernenko's speech reflects a Politburo decision that was made before Andropov's death. [redacted]

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23. We do not know the full range of differences within the Politburo on US-Soviet relations. The extent to which Chernenko and his colleagues will stand fast in their demand for significant changes in US positions, especially before the US elections, is unclear. They appear to be concerned, however, that any show of compromise in Moscow prior to some US move would be interpreted as a Soviet retreat in the face of a stiffening American defense posture. [redacted]

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24. The evidence at least suggests therefore that the Soviet leadership in the coming months is unlikely to approve any measures that imply a major breakthrough in relations unless they are convinced that some US concessions will be forthcoming on significant arms control issues. [redacted]

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Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

27 February 1984

Soviet Views on a Possible Summit Meeting

Summary

Certain trends in Soviet policy during the final weeks of Andropov's tenure, and Chernenko's seeming interest in greater efforts to improve bilateral relations, suggest that the Soviets might be willing to consider a proposal for a summit meeting. Nonetheless, domestic power considerations would affect the internal debate on the idea, and some Soviet leaders would be skeptical about the value of a summit at this time. The Politburo probably would agree only if confident that it would bring progress on one or more of the issues of concern to Moscow--INF, limiting weapons in outer space, START, MBFR, chemical warfare, or regional issues, particularly the Middle East. [redacted]

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Soviet Probes on Summit Prospects

1. In late 1983 and early 1984, there were several approaches by Eastern bloc diplomats [redacted] used by Moscow to convey signals to the US through unofficial channels, hinting at Moscow's interest in resuming the arms control dialogue and holding out the possibility of a summit. In late December, an East German diplomat [redacted] that success at the 18 January meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm could pave the way for a 1984 summit meeting. Just before the Shultz-Gromyko meeting, a Soviet diplomat [redacted] the USSR remained open to the idea of a 1984 summit, [redacted]

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- SOVA M 84-10028

This memorandum was prepared by [redacted] Strategic/Internal Branch, Current Support Division, Office of Soviet Analysis, and has not been coordinated outside that office. Questions and comments should be addressed to the Chief, Current Support Division, telephone [redacted]

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but only if it could be "substantive." He said the key to such a meeting was progress in the INF talks, particularly over the issue of UK and French systems. [redacted]

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2. Soviet public statements on bilateral relations during this period remained generally negative and avoided any mention of the possibility of a summit. Statements consistent with the idea occasionally appeared, however, such as a remark by a Moscow television commentator on 25 December that the USSR was "ready to deal with any US President." Responding to President Reagan's speech of 16 January, General Secretary Andropov said a week later that the Soviets needed no convincing as to the usefulness of dialogue and that there were possibilities for "serious discussion" of a number of problems. Along with not wishing to appear less willing to be conciliatory than the President, Andropov may have adopted his more moderate tone in part out of concern that Moscow's militant statements during the fall of 1983 had aroused excessive alarm among the Soviet public. [redacted]

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3. The accession of Konstantin Chernenko as General Secretary has given additional impetus to the hints of interest in reestablishing a dialogue that had begun to appear in the final weeks of Andropov's tenure, and may have increased Moscow's willingness to consider the idea of a summit. The new leader has the reputation of having supported Brezhnev's policy of improving relations with the US, which placed a high value on personal diplomacy. Chernenko's accession speech professed interest in settling international problems through "serious, equal and constructive talks," and his speech at Andropov's funeral reiterated readiness for "talks on the basis of equality and equal security." Chernenko's supporters, at least, might favor a summit as a way of enhancing the new leader's stature as a world statesman both at home and abroad. [redacted]

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4. [redacted] after Chernenko's accession to the top Party post, [redacted]

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[redacted] under Chernenko, Moscow would be more inclined to assess US initiatives on their merits and to strike a deal in 1984, even if it improved the President's chances of being reelected. [redacted] negotiations on limiting weapons in space were not far behind the resumption of INF talks as a Soviet priority, and that if an agreement on space could be reached, a summit might be possible in 1984. [redacted]

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[redacted] that the Soviets want the US to propose merging INF and START talks and that agreement to do so could be announced at a summit meeting. [redacted]

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[redacted] the Soviet leadership is discussing the possibility of a summit meeting in late May 1984. [redacted] Party Secretary Gorbachev is taking the lead in advocating the idea. These allusions to the possibility of a summit may be trial balloons to establish whether the prospect will help induce the US administration to make new arms control initiatives. [redacted]

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6. Despite the desire to get a dialogue going again and Chernenko's apparent inclination to seek improved relations, a proposal to hold a summit meeting this year almost certainly would arouse intense debate in Moscow. Aside from the pros and cons of any substantive initiative accompanying the proposal, the Soviets would consider carefully its possible impact on the US political scene, and individual Soviet leaders would be keenly aware of its implications for Chernenko's personal status. West European support for the idea would also enter into Soviet deliberations, as Moscow continues its efforts to convince public opinion in the NATO countries of its good faith in seeking to reduce international tensions. [redacted]

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Potential Sources of Opposition

7. One view in Moscow, evident in a number of commentaries and private statements since last September, holds that there is no possibility of reaching an agreement with the present US administration on major issues such as arms control. [redacted] during the final months of Andropov's regime indicated that the Soviets were determined to do nothing to enhance the administration's prospects for being reelected, although most Soviets appear to believe that those prospects are good whatever Moscow does. Those holding such views would be likely to argue against the idea of a summit, unless they could be convinced that an agreement could be reached that would address some of Moscow's concerns. Without the prospect of positive results, they would likely assert that a summit would be primarily a US propaganda show staged to help the President get reelected. A Japanese newspaper reports that an editor of Novosti voiced these views in expressing doubt last Friday that a summit would occur this year. [redacted]

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8. It is also possible that some members of the Soviet leadership would be cool toward a move that enhanced Chernenko's status, preferring that his personal authority continue to be limited by a collegial relationship. There appears, however, to be a tendency in Moscow to seek to establish Chernenko's authority as quickly as possible. Ogarkov, for example, has already referred to him as Chairman of the Defense Council. [redacted]

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9. It is likely that the two Politburo members most influential in foreign policy decisions, Foreign Minister Gromyko and Defense Minister Ustinov, would at least be skeptical about the idea of an early summit, and might oppose it. In an "interview" with TASS last June, Gromyko acknowledged that a summit could produce major results under proper conditions, but he asserted that these were lacking on the US side. He noted, however, that things would look different if there were signs of US readiness to conduct relations "in a serious and constructive manner." He has not indicated that he has seen such signs yet. In his speech last month to the Conference on Disarmament in Europe at Stockholm, Gromyko said that US statements of readiness to talk while continuing to deploy missiles were "verbal camouflage," and that the USSR will not engage in talks that serve as a "cover for militarist plans." In a speech on 27 February, Gromyko repeated Andropov's implied condition that the new US missiles must be withdrawn from Europe in order for INF talks to resume. [redacted]

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10. Ustinov has not directly addressed the idea of a summit, but in an article in Pravda as recently as 23 February, he was critical of US intentions in a manner that suggests he would be highly skeptical of a summit's

advisability. His Armed Forces Day address--traditionally an occasion for tough rhetoric--was not as forthcoming about the desire for dialogue as Chernenko had been or, indeed, as Ustinov himself had been on a similar occasion a year earlier. He accused the US administration of seeking to deal with the USSR from a position of "strength, threats, and pressure." [REDACTED]

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Outlook

11. The existence of a strongly pessimistic strain in Soviet thinking about relations with the US, and the possible coolness of Gromyko and Ustinov to the idea of a summit, do not mean that the Soviets would necessarily reject such a proposal. It is likely, however, that Moscow would agree only if confident that it would yield some tangible benefit. Judging from public and private statements, the following issues are those on which the prospect of progress would seem most likely to lead the Soviet leadership seriously to consider a summit meeting:

- The Soviets accord highest priority by far to securing US agreement to a formula for resuming the INF talks that would ensure that UK and French systems are accounted for in some forum, and freeze further deployments by either side while negotiations continue.
- Other arms control issues are of lower priority to Moscow, for now at least. Depending, however, on how the Soviets weight the potential political impact, both domestically and in the US, the prospect of movement on one or more of these issues might tip the balance in favor of a summit. They include limitation of weapons in outer space, START, MBFR, and chemical warfare.
- The Soviets have also expressed interest in serious bilateral talks--though not necessarily a summit--on critical regional conflicts in which both sides have an interest in avoiding confrontation, most notably the Middle East. [REDACTED]

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SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR DCI

1. Moscow's current policy toward the US is to maximize pressures on the administration during an election year to extract concessions, especially in arms control.

- The basic Soviet aim -- admittedly a long shot -- is to deflect the Reagan Administration from its main foreign policy course of rearmament and tough competition with the USSR.
- 1984 offers their best, perhaps last, chance to do this.

2. But they have not, repeat NOT, made any fundamental decisions to change their own basic policies to mitigate the competition yet. The notion that the Soviets are at a basic turning point of policy because of Chernenko is mistaken.

- a. They were moving toward more tactical flexibility before Chernenko acceded to power.
- b. Even if Chernenko is more powerful than he sometimes looks, the leadership is not in shape to make a major departure from the strategies of the past decade.
 - Remember, on things that matter most to the US, Andropov was not that different from Brezhnev.
- c. The Soviets have no reason to embrace a fixed view of the US now. In the Soviet view ...
 - Reagan will probably be reelected, but it's not certain.
 - Even if he is reelected, economic and political realities are likely to make his reach greater than his grasp in defense and foreign policy during a second term.
- d. The Soviets are very unlikely to hold the view that "it's better to strike a deal before the election than after."
 - It will be impossible to sign, much less ratify, a major "agreement" e.g., INF, before the election.
 - The appearance of a deal-in-the-offing would probably help the President's reelection prospects, something which the Soviets do not want to do, according to all our sources.
 - Soviets would see a high risk that a reelected Reagan administration would break away from a pre-election agreement in principle.

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3. They want to create the appearance, particularly to the top levels of the USG, that they are ready for "a deal." But they are not yet ready on their own part for the concessions necessary to make "a deal" of real or lasting value for the US.

- This accounts for the faintest hints of reasonableness in some public statements (recently turned hard again) and private encouragement from Dobrynin on prospects for relations.

4. Even this narrow tactical purpose on the Soviet part, however, makes them willing to engage in an arms-length minuet.

- This offers the US the opportunity to create the image of slight improvement in US/Soviet relations, of benefit to us with allies and publics.
- The risk for the US is that the Soviets -- having a more disciplined system -- will manipulate us more effectively than we manipulate them.

5. Given the Soviet tactical interest, we can probably keep alive their willingness to engage in exploratory dialogue, at least to the extent seen since January, without major concessions on START, INF, and other areas where we are far apart (e.g., ASAT, Chemical Weapons).

- A cautious US approach would concentrate on CBMs (e.g., HOTLINE) and peripheral issues ... at least for some months.

6. To get more dramatic movement we probably have to consider more costly concessions. The crucial concession the Soviets are clearly Looking for is a moratorium on INF deployments.

- The Soviets believe that an INF moratorium, and perhaps just talk about a moratorium, could rekindle the INF controversy in Europe and stop further US deployments permanently.

7. During the election, the Soviets will try to create an atmosphere in which the two US candidates compete in terms of who can better create amity with Moscow.

- This will create pressure for US concessions.

8. If the US holds firm during a period of maximum political "vulnerability", i.e., 1984, this will go a long way to creating the conditions for a more genuinely flexible Soviet posture in 1985-1988.

- During the latter period US political freedom of movement will be greater.

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- The results of our defense programs will begin to show.
- A stronger Soviet political leadership with better prospects for longevity may emerge and be better equipped to engage in longer-term planning and genuine give-and-take.

10. Throughout 1984 we have to remember the supreme importance of preserving the kind of credibility in Moscow that would allow us to manage a real crisis which could blow up at any time, e.g., in the Gulf.

- It would be dangerous to create the illusion in Moscow that the US cannot for political reasons risk a worsening of relations such a crisis could entail.

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Proposed Talking Points for DCI at NSC/NSPG Meeting, 27 March 1984

1. As always, the Soviets are acting in arms control in five areas of increasing political sensitivity:
 - o public statements, as in TASS, et al.
 - o unofficial bilateral exchanges of views, as in Dartmouth Group, et al.
 - o official exchanges, as in MBFR, CDE, SCC, etc.
 - o private or semi-private feelers, as in Dobrynin's "leaks" to Boston Globe, et al.
 - o official letters between President Reagan and General Secretary Chernenko.
2. There is not, and probably cannot be, substantive consistency in all five channels from day-to-day or even week-to-week. It is too hard to orchestrate all that.
3. The mix of "positive" and "negative" channels varies over time; in some cases, as today, public statements and official letters are congruent in substance.
4. In fact, I think it is clear the Soviets are purposely "talking out of both sides of their mouths."
5. The key question is whether any meaning is there for the US.
6. The USSR clearly is looking for US "concessions", such as taking UK and French nuclear missiles into account somewhere. Such steps by US would:
 - o look good in their own right to USSR.
 - o let the USSR out of the political box they created when they left INF and START.
 - o be useful for any internal arguments in USSR that this leadership knows how to deal with the US.

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7. In any case, the Soviets will be tough bargainers in normal diplomatic channels or private ones. 1984 will complicate in obvious ways any US or USSR efforts to:
- o identify areas of mutual interest for any progress.
 - o actually work it out.
8. The Soviets appear to have adopted a two-pronged strategy on arms control, taking an inflexible line on INF and START, while simultaneously expressing willingness, and signaling that a breakthrough in US-Soviet relations is possible if Washington shows flexibility in these other areas.
9. They presumably calculate that this strategy enables them to stand firm on the central issues of INF and START, without making themselves appear so intransigent as to rally support for NATO's policies or to demonstrate that they, not the Administration, are responsible for poor US-Soviet relations.
10. Meanwhile, they continue to probe for flexibility on a range of issues, with the aim of extracting the maximum price for any marked improvement in relations or arms control issues before the US elections.
11. The Politburo will be wary of any major steps unless convinced that significant gains are at hand for the USSR, especially on their fundamental concerns in START and INF.

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cripple the Nicaraguan economy, but no more.

Fred Francis, NBC News, on the Nicaraguan border.

Eighteen Marines Killed in Crash

CHUNG: Eighteen U. S. Marines are believed dead in a helicopter crash 170 miles southeast of Seoul, South Korea.

The Marines were engaged in war game maneuvers with South Korean servicemen. Eleven South Koreans are also believed killed.

The Marine chopper apparently went down in rugged mountains because of bad weather.

This is the second time in a week these military exercises have been marred by an incident. On Wednesday, a nuclear-powered submarine rammed the U. S. Aircraft Carrier Kitty Hawk in the Sea of Japan.

CBS SUNDAY EVENING NEWS
CBS TV 6:00 PM MARCH 25

Arens Denies Weinberger Remark

MORTON DEAN: Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens emphatically denies some remarks attributed to him in today's New York Times Magazine.

The cover article says Mr. Arens called Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, quote, "a prime candidate for psychoanalysis." Mr. Arens also disputes another point in the article, that he once offered to return disputed border territory to Egypt in exchange for a meeting with the Egyptian defense minister.

The editor of the New York Times Magazine says he stands behind the story.

ABC WORLD NEWS TONIGHT ABC TV
6:30 PM MARCH 25

No News of Relevance to DOD

NBC SUNDAY NIGHT NEWS NBC TV
6:30 PM MARCH 25

U.S.-Soviet Dialogue Unlikely

JOHN PALMER: French President Francois Mitterand called on the United States and the Soviet Union today to resume their dialogue and end what he called a period of mutual silence. But as Marvin Kalb reports, that silence, especially on the part of the Soviet Union, is likely to continue.

MARVIN KALB: According to U.S. experts, the new Soviet leadership has decided not to respond positively to President Reagan's recent overtures for an improvement in relations.

Just back from Moscow, two retired generals, Brent Scowcroft and David Jones, with bleak assessments about resuming nuclear arms negotiations anytime soon.

Scowcroft had a message from the President for the new Kremlin leader, Konstantin Chernenko. But the Russians never gave him a chance to deliver it. Jones wanted to talk with the Soviet Chief of Staff, General Nikolai Agargov. But no meeting was arranged.

The current view is that Chernenko, after earlier indications that he'd like to improve relations, has either changed his mind or been reined in by the Communist Party and military bureaucracies; his view now described as not wishing to help the President get reelected, but prepared with half-steps to keep the lines of communication open.

French President Francois Mitterand, appearing on NBC's "Meet the Press," urged the

U.S. SAYS MOSCOW REFUSED A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT

PRIVATE ENVOY REBUFFED

Scowcroft, Carrying Reagan's
Note, Wasn't Given Chance
to See Soviet Leaders

By **LESLIE H. GELB**

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 23 — A private American envoy carrying a personal message from President Reagan to Konstantin U. Chernenko in Moscow was not given the opportunity to meet with the Soviet leader or any other top Soviet official, according to Administration officials.

The officials said the envoy, Lieut. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, retired, the chairman of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, made known to Soviet officials when he was in Moscow two weeks ago that he had a personal Presidential letter and some additional authorized comments, but never heard anything back and was never given an explanation.

U.S. Elections Seen as Factor

In Moscow, Western diplomats who have talked with Soviet officials say they believe the Soviet Union is likely to remain cool for some time to American overtures because of uncertainty over the American elections and other factors. But President François Mitterrand, ending two days of talks in Washington, said he believed Moscow may be reassessing its position on arms control talks, and he warned against "creating new causes of dissension" in East-West relations. [Page 3.]

American administrations have on several occasions used private go-betweens known to be respected in Moscow to deliver high-level messages to Soviet leaders at times of difficulty in formal Soviet-American relations. Administration officials said they could not recollect any previous instance of Soviet officials' refusing to receive an envoy and a message at appropriate levels.

Administration officials read this as another sign that top Soviet leaders are either unwilling or unable to agree on restarting nuclear arms talks or any

Continued on Page 3, Column 1

Moscow Refuses a Message From President

visible negotiating contacts unless Washington first makes concrete gestures or concessions.

On Thursday, Arthur A. Hartman, the United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union, said in Washington that the two countries were involved in talks that "could lead to some kind of progress on the more serious issues."

He added that he hoped for a resumption of talks on a cultural and scientific exchange accord that expired in 1980.

The message taken to Moscow by Mr. Scowcroft, according to the sources, was that Mr. Reagan was prepared for serious and wide-ranging talks and accommodations with the Soviet Union, including suggestions on the stalled nuclear arms talks, if Soviet negotiators would return to the bargaining table.

Responses 'Pretty Frosty'

This was said to be identical to other Presidential messages in recent weeks, starting with Vice President Bush's meeting with Mr. Chernenko a month ago at the time of Yuri V. Andropov's funeral. At least two other letters were said to have been exchanged by the leaders since then.

A high State Department official said, "Essentially, we've been telling them that we're serious and ready to engage, and their responses have all been pretty frosty."

Soviet officials were said to have told Mr. Scowcroft and American diplomats that they viewed these enticements as a trick to lure Moscow back into negotiations in order to convince the American public and world leaders that a serious dialogue is under way, and thus help Mr. Reagan's re-election prospects without advancing the negotiations. They have called for American deeds, not just words, and in particular some commitment to eliminate the medium-range American missiles recently deployed in Europe.

Mr. Scowcroft went to Moscow for four days as a member of a private group of American foreign policy experts to engage in informal talks with Soviet officials. Known as the Dartmouth Group, it has, with varying membership, met with Soviet arms control experts yearly for almost two decades. Mr. Scowcroft was out of the country and unavailable for comment, but other participants characterized the exchanges as the most negative ever.

The sources also said Gen. David C. Jones, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and another mem-

ber of the group, asked to meet with top Soviet generals and was refused.

Administration officials said Hans-Jochen Vogel and Egon Bahr, two leaders of the West German Social Democratic Party and established advocates of improving East-West relations, were in Moscow at the same time as the Dartmouth Group and were received by Mr. Chernenko. But, the officials said what Mr. Chernenko said to them was no more promising than what was told to the Dartmouth Group.

3 Theories on Soviet Position

There are three competing theories in the Administration to explain the hard-line Soviet position.

One is that Soviet leaders are in agreement about rejecting any activity that might help Mr. Reagan's re-election prospects and believe his Administration's bargaining position would not be much different in a second term than it is now. Accordingly, there is not much incentive to restart talks now.

The second is that a leadership struggle is under way in Moscow, with some wanting to resume the dialogue and others opposed, and as a result they cannot agree on doing anything new.

The third is that Moscow means what it says, that if Washington made concessions first, it would go back to the Geneva arms control talks, which have been suspended since December.

U.S. ELECTION SEEN AFFECTING MOSCOW

Surge by Hart Among Several Factors Cited in Continued Cool Washington Ties

By JOHN F. BURNS

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, March 23 — Despite efforts by the Reagan Administration to break the impasse in Soviet-American relations, Western diplomats and visitors who have talked with senior Soviet officials believe that a number of factors, including uncertainty over the Presidential election, are likely to persuade the Kremlin to remain cool toward Washington's overtures for some time to come.

In particular, the diplomats say, the United States is likely to find the Soviet leadership reluctant to resume the negotiations on nuclear weapons that have been in abeyance since late last year unless Washington offers a prior concession of the kind the Kremlin has been demanding on the issues that have led to deadlocks on two sets of weapons talks.

Six weeks ago, after Konstantin U. Chernenko became the Soviet leader on the death of Yuri V. Andropov, there were hopes that Mr. Chernenko would break the impasse.

President Reagan's speech on Jan. 16 seeking a renewed dialogue between the two countries marked at least a modest shift on American policy. Mr. Chernenko greeted Vice President Bush and other Western dignitaries after the funeral of Mr. Andropov in a positive manner that was taken by some Western envoys as a harbinger of new diplomatic moves.

Hart Seen as a Factor

Recently, those hopes have dimmed. Since early this month there has been a shift back to the chilly and implacable mood that set in after the Russians walked out of the medium-range missile talks in Geneva in November, and followed that up by suspending parallel negotiations on strategic, or long-range, weapons.

The Kremlin has rebuffed diplomatic probes from Washington, and has driven the message home by adopting a stringent and uncooperative attitude on a range of lesser issues.

One element that seems to be deterring the Kremlin is the emergence of Senator Gary Hart as a serious contender for the Democratic presidential nomination.

Soviet officials and commentators who were talking a few weeks ago as though they regarded President Reagan as odds-on to be re-elected are suddenly saying that the election could hinge on the state of Soviet-American relations, and that the Democrats could still win.

Diplomats say they sense that this has had a major impact on policy toward the United States. As long as Mr. Reagan was regarded as likely to overwhelm his Democratic opponent, the diplomats say, there was a chance that the Soviet leaders might seek arms agreements with him before the election.

Now many diplomats believe that Mr. Hart's successes in the primaries and the emphasis he has placed on a nuclear weapons freeze is impelling the Russians in the other direction, away from any early concessions.

This stance may have attractions for the Kremlin regardless of whether Mr. Hart emerges as the Democratic nominee. As the diplomats view it, the Russians see the Colorado Senator as pushing the nuclear weapons issue into the forefront of the campaign, thus increasing the pressure on Mr. Reagan to modify his position. At the same time, by enlivening the Democratic contest, the diplomats say, Mr. Hart is seen as increasing the chances that either he or former Vice President Walter F. Mondale will give Mr. Reagan a good contest in November.

In the meantime, it is plain that the Kremlin sees a resumption of negotiations with the Reagan Administration as a political prize that would help the President's election chances.

What this implies is that an arms

concession of sufficient importance by Mr. Reagan would outweigh other considerations and could prompt the reopening of talks.

And there were new indications today that the Kremlin's price for a nuclear agreement would remain high.

Two articles by the official press agency, Tass, said that there could be no return to the negotiations on medium-range missiles without prior withdrawal of the Pershing 2 and cruise missiles that the United States began deploying in Britain and West Germany at the end of last year.

One of the Tass articles rebutted for the first time a compromise proposal promoted in some quarters in the West under which talks would resume on a Western pledge to freeze further deployment.

One Tass piece also discussed an interview given to a West German newspaper, *Offenburger Tagblatt*, by the West German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl.

Tass said Mr. Kohl had predicted that Moscow would return to the Geneva talks. But the Tass article said: "The Soviet Union will not take part in such a game, and will not have such talks and discussions. The Soviet stand on that issue is most explicit and clear cut. The way to the talks can open only through withdrawal of the American missiles."

Soviets Seen Strongly Against Arms Parley

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

American experts on defense and Soviet affairs, who have just returned from informal meetings with top officials in Moscow, report that the Kremlin appears to have decided not to resume suspended nuclear arms talks until the Reagan administration demonstrates with "clear deeds" that it is serious about reaching agreements.

One member of the so-called "Dartmouth Group," a private group whose various members have been meeting with Soviet officials annually for some 20 years, said he had "never seen the atmosphere so bad. They [the Soviets] don't want to talk about any kind of arms control."

"They were very negative, very rigid and showed no interest in even probing for possible openings," added another member.

Another said he was surprised by the Soviet rigidity because it came just a month or so after some relatively moderate public remarks by the new Soviet leader Konstantin U. Chernenko and after some apparently less strident comments to two visiting U.S. senators earlier this month.

It was the overwhelmingly negative Soviet attitude at the five-day meeting last week, several members said, that led to the feeling that Moscow now has completed its assessment of the situation, since Chernenko took office Feb. 13, and has decided against any quick arms control deals which might help Reagan get reelected.

Although the American visitors are private citizens and do not speak for the administration, they are a

high-powered group that includes retired Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, who headed President Reagan's commission on U.S. strategic nuclear forces; retired Gen. David C. Jones, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and two leading U.S. ex-

See ARMS, A20, Col. 1

ARMS, From A1

Experts on the Soviet Union, Arnold Horelick of the Rand Corp. and William Hyland of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Leading the group was Paul Doty, director of the center for science and international affairs at Harvard.

Their Soviet counterparts included Georgi Arbatov, senior Kremlin adviser on U.S. affairs; Lt. Gen. Viktor P. Starodubov, a member of the Soviet general staff; A.A. Obukov, deputy chief of the Soviet delegation to the strategic arms reduction talks (START), and Valentin M. Falin, a former ambassador to West Germany.

The Soviet views have been relayed to the White House and may account in part for Reagan's comments to a French magazine on Wednesday that "some of the rhetoric coming out of Moscow is less than encouraging. Nonetheless," Reagan added, "I remain hopeful."

Sources close to the Dartmouth group stressed that there is no way to be sure that the Soviets had made an official decision not to return to either of the suspended Geneva negotiations on long-range missiles and bombers known as START and the INF talks dealing with medium-range missiles in Europe.

Nonetheless, they said, "now all the signs are sharply negative" and that their assessment is shared by the U.S. ambassador to Moscow, Arthur Hartman.

They also said they did not know what, if anything, was going on in so-called "back channel" private communications between officials.

Kremlin Is Seen Opposed to Arms Talk

There have been a number of meetings between Hartman and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko and between Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin. But aside from these, Hartman said yesterday on the NBC-TV "Today" show, there are no back-channel talks going on.

Officials said that a Hartman-Gromyko meeting about 10 days ago was "an hour and a half of unrelieved vitriol" paralleling what the Dartmouth group members heard.

U.S. sources said the Soviets appear both stung and extremely defensive over the ability of the United States and the NATO allies to go ahead with deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe this winter despite strong protests by Moscow and European peace movements.

The Soviets, who walked out of both talks after deployments began, told their visitors that the Pershings are aimed at knocking out their military command posts and that Reagan's new emphasis on anti-missile defense suggests that the United States is seeking a one-two punch to neutralize Soviet missile forces.

Although Moscow has fielded 378 new SS20 missiles aimed at Europe and Asia, the Soviets charged that Washington was changing the strategic balance by deploying the new missiles in Europe which could reach Soviet territory. They claimed this was a violation of the untitled 1979 SALT II strategic arms limitation agreement that both sides pledged to uphold.

The Soviets reportedly said that Washington only engaged in INF talks to cover the deployment and that there was no point in further INF talks until the deployment was reversed. Sources said the Soviets rejected inquiries from the visitors about whether there would be renewed interest in Moscow in the so-called "in the woods" formula worked out informally in 1982 by the U.S. and Soviet chief INF negotiators. That formula later was officially rejected by both sides.

The Soviets also reportedly rejected inquiries about merging the INF and START talks indicated it was unreasonable to resume START negotiations without settling the shipping and cruise missile problem. The Soviets also showed no interest in a congressional-backed "build-down" scheme for reducing existing weapons, calling it a coverup permit introduction of more modern weapons.

"We got stonewalled on all of them," group member said. The Soviets, another member said, are clearly in a "hold" on arms control and are letting this country know.

Despite recent conciliatory speeches by Reagan, the predominant view of visitors is that Soviets remain deeply distrustful of the president and view his remarks as meant for domestic consumption.

Aside from reversing the new missile deployment, the Soviets have cited as "deeds" that would show good faith: ratification of the 1974 underground nuclear threshold test ban treaty and reaching accords on prohibition of anti-satellite weapons and chemical warfare.

W. Post, 23 Mar 84

THE WASHINGTON POST

Friday, March 21, 1984

A20

'Paralysis' in Soviet Decision-Making Seen Hampering Arms Control Talks

Associated Press

A three-year "paralysis" in Soviet decision-making, brought about by two leadership changes, has "severely hampered" U.S. efforts to reach arms control agreements, a top State Department official said yesterday.

Lawrence S. Eagleburger, undersecretary for political affairs, said that since the Reagan administration took office, the Soviets have not had the kind of leadership capable of making difficult decisions and accepting responsibility for them.

Virtually without exception, each time the Soviets have been faced with difficult choices, we have witnessed a period of apparent internal debate, followed inevitably by hard-line decisions clearly dictated by the most conservative elements in the Politburo," Eagleburger said.

His assessment apparently was in

response to administration critics who blame President Reagan for the failure of Moscow and Washington to reach arms control agreements.

Eagleburger's remarks were prepared for delivery to a foreign policy conference in Birmingham, Ala. A text of his speech was released by the State Department.

Eagleburger, the department's third-ranking official, said the administration has worked hard to put forward sensible arms control proposals.

"Yet, for now, at least, all we have to show for it is a Soviet walkout from the two most important arms control negotiations," he said, referring to the talks on reducing intermediate and medium-range nuclear weapons. He said that when the administration took office, Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev

was "aging and ailing," and his colleagues were positioning themselves for the succession.

Yuri V. Andropov, who succeeded Brezhnev in November, 1982, was seriously ill for much of his short tenure, Eagleburger said, and Konstantin U. Chernenko, who became Communist Party leader six weeks ago, "has yet to establish himself."

"This flux in the Kremlin has severely hampered the give-and-take of diplomacy in general," Eagleburger said, "and of our arms control talks in particular."

He said the lesson of the past three years is that the Soviet decision-making apparatus—in the absence of strong leadership that is prepared to exercise its authority—"is likely to seek refuge in a bureaucratically safe but substantively sterile hard line."



LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER
... "All we have is a Soviet walko

Washington Wire

A Special Weekly Report From The Wall Street Journal's Capital Bureau

WSJ, 23 Nov 84

U.S.-SOVIET FRICTION grows over private talks to ease tensions.

The two sides dispute the current talks' significance; analysts detect an election-year propaganda war. Moscow is peeved by a Shultz statement touting "private diplomatic discussions" to seek possible accord on arms control and other issues. The Soviets claim Shultz spreads false optimism. They deny that a private meeting in Moscow between Gromyko and U.S. Ambassador Hartman made any progress.

The Reagan administration, with eyes on the election, wants to make relations seem better than they are. A top official insists the quiet discussions are continuing "to see if he can solve some of these problems." Moscow tries to paint a bleak picture—for fear that any appearance of progress might only help Reagan's reelection chances.

Many U.S. officials doubt any breakthrough on nuclear-arms issues this year. But the Soviets will have to deal with Reagan next year if he is re-elected.

U.S. Envoy Looks to Soviet Talks On a New Cultural Exchange Pact

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 22 — Arthur A. Hartman, the United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union, said today that the two countries were involved in talks that "could lead to some kind of progress on the more serious issues."

He said he hoped for a resumption of talks on a cultural and scientific exchange agreement. Negotiations on exchanges and on establishing consulates in New York and Kiev were about to be revived last summer when President Reagan ordered a suspension in response to the downing of a South Korean airliner by a Soviet plane.

The exchange agreement expired in 1980 and was not renewed by the Carter Administration because of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The establishment of the additional consulates was also canceled by President Carter.

In another East-West forum, the European security talks in Stockholm, the Soviet Union was said to be testing

was debating whether to ask the Senate to approve two nuclear treaties with the Soviet Union. One, limiting underground weapon tests to the equivalent of 150 kilotons of TNT, was signed in 1974; the other, on monitoring nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, was signed in 1976. They have never been acted on.

Kenneth L. Adelman, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said in an interview, "There are people in the Administration who want to go ahead with these two treaties, and people who don't want to."

Mr. Adelman would not say what his position was, but other officials have said that Senate approval is being sought by the State Department and is opposed by the Pentagon, with Mr. Adelman's position ambiguous.

He said the National Security Council had met twice on the subject.

Mr. Adelman said those advocating approval argue that a treaty signed by a President should be brought to the Senate for approval. A second reason cited for Senate action is that the United States and the Soviet Union have already agreed not to violate the 150-kiloton limit.

He said the advocates also argue that ratification would make it easier to verify compliance because each side would be required to turn over geological data about test sites and allow some on-site inspection.

Mr. Adelman said those opposed were dissatisfied with the verification aspects and felt that a Senate debate would divert attention from more important arms control talks.

In a report to Congress last January, the Administration said that, although information was questionable because of the difficulties involved, it was "likely" that there had been some Soviet underground explosions over the 150-kiloton limit. The Russians have also ac-

cused the United States of violating the limit. Both sides have denied doing so.

Ratification by the United States was cited by Mr. Chernenko in a speech on March 2 as the kind of concrete measures by which the United States could "prove its peaceableness by deeds."

Mr. Hartman met with Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko 10 days ago, and Secretary of State George P. Shultz conferred with Anatoly F. Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador, at about the same time.

"We have tried over the last little while to see whether or not it is possible to begin to get at discussions of some problems that separate us," Mr. Hartman said on the "Today" program. "We are trying to see whether it is possible through diplomatic channels to begin to deal with some of these issues."

"I think there is a readiness for dialogue. The question is, is there a readiness to sit down and really discuss substantive issues, for example, to go back into the arms control talks."

The Russians quit the talks after deployment of American missiles began.

"I think there is a readiness to discuss some of the bilateral issues," Mr. Hartman said. "I would hope, for example, that we would be soon able to talk more seriously about an exchange agreement. We are looking at a whole series of areas that perhaps could warm up the relationship, could lead to some kind of progress on the more serious issues."

He said there had been no discussion of a possible summit meeting.

"Our position on the whole question

of a summit is that you have got to have something worthwhile to discuss," Mr. Hartman said. "We are now trying to see whether there are worthwhile things to discuss."

Lawrence S. Eagleburger, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, speaking today in Birmingham, Ala., attributed the problems in relations with the Soviet Union to the absence of strong leadership in Moscow.

He said there had been three Soviet leaders during the Reagan Administration and "this flux in the Kremlin has severely hampered the give-and-take of diplomacy in general, and of our arms control negotiations in particular."

"Productive negotiations require flexibility, and flexibility requires leadership that is willing to make difficult decisions and accept responsibility for them," he said.

NATO interest in a statement renouncing the use of force to clear the way for a resumption of arms talks. [Page A8.]

Ambassador Hartman returned to Washington several days ago for the second time in less than a month to consult and to talk to outside groups in an effort to promote support for a more positive approach to dealing with the Soviet Union. He has been cautious on the possibilities because of what he perceives to be a power struggle involving the new leader, Konstantin U. Chernenko, and others in the Politburo.

"It is very difficult for me to say today what their policies are," Mr. Hartman said on the NBC News program "Today." "For one thing, I think that there are differences of opinion within Moscow. There is perhaps some competition for leadership."

Another official said the Government

Continued on Page A10, Column 3

NONUSE OF FORCE OFFERED TO NATO

Moscow Is Reported Testing Willingness of the Alliance to Agree on Statement

By JOHN VINOCUR

Special to The New York Times

BRUSSELS, March 22 — Western diplomats attending the East-West security conference in Stockholm say the Soviet Union is sending signals about how the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear arms could resume.

According to one of the diplomats, discussions with Soviet officials have produced "evidence of a link" between Soviet interest in a statement renouncing the use of force and a resumption of the talks on limiting strategic and medium-range nuclear missiles, which broke up late last year.

The diplomat said it would be up to West to decide whether to test "a number of fairly explicit hints" received from the Russians. The Soviet suggestion is that if the United States, as leader of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, were to say publicly that it would consider a statement on nonuse of force, then this would provide "a favorable element" toward restarting the arms talks.

The diplomats reporting on the development were among delegates who briefed Atlantic alliance officials here this week on progress at the Stockholm conference. The first phase of the conference, which began in January ended last Friday. It is scheduled to resume in May.

U.S. Appears to Be Opposed

A delegate who discussed the signals said they came in a statement made by the Soviet delegate, Oleg A. Grinevsky, at a closed session of the conference, and then in private talks with Mr. Grinevsky. The Soviet diplomat has served in the Foreign Ministry's Middle East and International Organizations departments.

The United States considers that there is no reason to offer the Soviet Union a face-saving gesture since it was Moscow that chose to break off the arms talks last year in protest against the deployment of new American medium-range missiles in Western Europe. This position was re-emphasized on Tuesday by Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, the United States delegate to the United Nations, in a television interview in Vienna.

American officials have said privately that injecting a nonaggression pledge into the Stockholm conference — whose mandate is limiting the risk of military confrontation in Europe by specific, binding measures — would offer a false message to public opinion at time when the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan continues. Such a statement, in the view of some NATO

officials, would also result in additional pressure for a Western pledge not to use nuclear weapons first, a position they feel would undermine the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.

Statement Termed Superfluous

Other Western officials say that the nonaggression declaration sought by the Russians is superfluous since renunciation-of-force engagements are already contained in the United Nations Charter, in the Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki conference and in NATO documents.

But some Western governments have suggested a willingness to consider such a statement. Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher of West Germany, referring to an Atlantic alliance declaration that it would never use force except in self-defense, said in a speech in Stockholm in January that "it could serve the cause of confidence-building if all participants were ready to make an equally comprehensive pledge."

A West German official here said Bonn would have no trouble with a statement renouncing force if the Warsaw Pact countries agreed to NATO demands for greater "transparency" between the blocs, such as advance notification of troop movements and the posting of observers at all maneuvers.

A West German representative suggested that the United States might wish to see how the Russians would react in relation to the arms reduction talks if the Reagan Administration indicated its readiness to discuss a force-renunciation statement under certain conditions.

Improvement in Climate an Issue

One analysis here is that the Soviet Union, after its warnings of the world's being endangered by the Western missile deployment, could not return to the arms talks without being able to say that the international climate had changed. If this is the case, the argument runs, then Western willingness to discuss the Soviet Union's nonuse-of-force concept could provide the face-saving change needed by Moscow.

James E. Goodby, the United States delegate in Stockholm, described the issue at a news conference here as a possible "factor for later discussion". But he added, "I don't think anyone would want to offer it up on a plate."

So far, the Warsaw Pact countries have not offered an formal proposal in Stockholm to match the specific confidence-building measures called for by the NATO countries.

The eight neutral and nonaligned nations attending the meeting have made a proposal that calls for more detailed exchange of information on military movements that could lead to a statement on force renunciation.

If these proposals are accepted, the neutral countries' document says, "they thereby create conditions for considering a reaffirmation, in appropriate ways and forms, of the commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes, undertaken in the United Nations Charter and the Final Act."

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U.S. Soviet Relations-A Return to Reality

President Reagan's January 16 foreign policy address, followed one week later by a presidential report to the Congress that the Soviet Union has violated arms control agreements, marked a turning point in Soviet-American relations. The President's address was in response both to the complaints of the Soviet leadership and to the prophets of gloom and doom on both sides of the Atlantic. Leading the chorus of gloom, with expressions of bitterness and distress at the failure of their four year effort to halt the deployment of new Western missiles, the Soviet leadership broke off the Intermediate Nuclear Force talks at Geneva and refused to set a resumption date for the START talks on strategic nuclear weapons.

This interruption of the major arms control negotiations between East and West, following on the Soviet destruction of KAL Flight 007, was the final nail in the coffin of the policy of détente that began collapsing after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.

Following the downing of the Korean airliner last September 1, relations between the superpowers perceptibly deteriorated. The Western response to the airliner incident was relatively restrained; for example, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko was refused permission to land at New York and subsequently chose not to attend the U.N. General Assembly session. But this and the President's strong denunciation of the Soviet action apparently was felt keenly in the Kremlin, which issued a counter-statement by Andropov attacking the United States. Soviet belligerence reached a new high as the Soviet press charged the U.S. with cynicism,

falsehoods and shameless deception. With the Soviets threatening to shoot down other planes that might stray over their territory, and continuing to encourage European opposition to the deployment of Western missiles, relations deteriorated further.

To these events must be added the novel appearance of senior Soviet military commanders as press conference briefers, the announcement of Soviet counter-deployments of missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and the disappearance for six months of Yuri Andropov, generating speculation about a power struggle in the Kremlin.

All this has combined to cause a considerable increase in anxiety in some sectors of the public and the media, both here and in Europe. The Soviets have tried to take full advantage of this anxiety with a massive public relations campaign portraying the Reagan Administration as leading the world toward war. After the action in Grenada and the deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe, the Soviet press raved about imperialist aggression, a new stage in the arms race, U.S. militaristic

policies upsetting the balance of power, and even the threat of war. The resulting uneasiness has led a number of Europeans to call for a return to détente, which is an article of faith for many on the continent.

These Europeans have found echoes in America from those who consider any arms control talks, no matter how unsuccessful, as mandatory rituals that somehow ensure peace between East and West. Critics of the administration have talked of a return to the Cold War and warned darkly of a

CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY

The death of Soviet President Yuri Andropov underscores the main points made in this issue—that U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union requires national unity and constancy of purpose. The leadership of the Soviet Union does not change rapidly; those aging leaders who have been determining policy for the past year very likely will continue to do so. But both the U.S. and the Soviet Union now have a new opportunity.

It is an opportunity to offer the Soviet leadership a new beginning, a chance to improve relations regardless of past statements or actions by either side. The President has made clear his desire to find a formula to reduce armaments and to establish a better relationship. Just a month ago he offered to begin a new era in U.S.-Soviet relations based on peaceful competition and constructive cooperation. He has now repeated that offer to the Soviet leadership. This could be their opportunity to break with the past and begin to move away from the policies that produced an unprecedented military buildup and global adventurism. They could begin by returning to the START negotiations, by saying publicly that they will not attack civilian airliners in the future and by initiating the withdrawal of their troops from Afghanistan. Such moves would be in the mutual interest of both countries and world peace. More than ever, the U.S. must present an image of bipartisan resolve to the Soviet Union. If we do so and they seize the moment, it could be the beginning of a new and better relationship.

slide toward nuclear war. For example, Averell Harriman has written that we may be facing "the reality of nuclear war." Columnist Joseph Kraft blamed "Pentagon hawks" (rather than the Russians) for casting "a dark shadow" over the future. *The Washington Post* and others have predicted "a cold winter," while *Time* magazine in making Reagan and Andropov co-Men of the Year implied equal culpability for the deterioration in relations. The *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* reflected the new mood by moving the hands of its doomsday clock (surely the most discontinuous timepiece in history), from four to three minutes before midnight.

The administration's critics have suggested that its commitment to rebuilding our military strength, together with its firm position both in the arms control talks and in deploying new missiles to Europe, are the causes of the Soviets' antagonistic attitude. In other words, it's all the U.S.'s fault. Their solution is for the President to make concessions to "restore the dialogue," and then begin moving back toward a policy of détente.

THE FAILURE OF DÉTENTE

Yet the evidence is clear that détente was a failure, at least for the West. It is interesting what the Soviets say about détente. The official Russian history entitled *Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1980*, edited by no less than Andrei Gromyko, explains that "The policy of détente being pursued by the Soviet Union impedes the maneuvers of the aggressive forces of imperialism...". It is no wonder the men in the Kremlin like détente.

More important, détente harmed U.S. interests. Initiated early in the Nixon Administration to enlist Soviet cooperation in ending the Vietnam War, détente was the hope that a web of economic and social relationships could be developed between the West and the USSR that would provide more consumer goods for the Soviet people, create openings to a closed society and gradually modify the aggressive expansionism of the Soviet state. The key element of the policy was an improvement in economic ties between East and West. It was believed that these economic ties would become so important to Russian development that the Soviets would moderate their international behavior rather than risk losing them. Thus, it was a carrot and stick approach to dealing with the Soviets.

Economic incentives were the carrot and their withdrawal was to be the stick. But it failed to work that way from the beginning. The Soviets did not link their economic interests with their international military or political behavior. While the West held down military expenditures, the Soviets increased theirs. They saw détente as a means of neutralizing the West while they continued to stir up trouble to suit their own purposes in the third world. They supported foreign adventures in Angola, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and Central America, finally conducting a blatant invasion of Afghanistan, apparently without giving a second thought to jeopardizing their economic ties to the West. Nor did their economic relations deter them from suppressing the free trade union movement in Poland.

As it turned out, the ties that were supposed to constrain the Soviets instead deterred the West from taking firm action against Soviet aggression. When martial law was imposed in Poland, President Reagan's advisers convinced him to do nothing more meaningful than order the lighting of candles, sadly reminiscent of Jimmy Carter's refusal to light the national Christmas tree during the Iranian hostage crisis.

Yet the most significant failure of détente was in the military balance. Through the years of détente the Soviets methodically and systematically invested huge resources in

their military buildup, taking advantage of trade with the West and the transfer of advanced Western technology to develop strategic superiority and maintain it through an aggressive program of military modernization and growth. Part of that drive for strategic superiority was the development and deployment of 360 modern mobile SS-20 missiles, 248 of which presented a new and serious threat to Western Europe. It also included a dramatic increase in the number of Soviet warheads on their intercontinental missiles, together with improvements in accuracy. Soviet conventional forces, and particularly the Soviet navy, grew in strength far in excess of Soviet defense needs.

Growing Soviet military strength, combined with the ambivalent attitude of the Carter Administration toward U.S. allies and Soviet adventurism, enabled the Soviets to support military activities through surrogates around the globe. The fruits of détente, during which U.S. military power fell sharply vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, left the United States a helpless giant during the last years of the Carter Administration, unable or unwilling to defend U.S. global interests.

President Reagan promised to set all this right, offering the politics of optimism after four years of pessimism. He has accomplished much of what he set out to do and now proposes a new relationship with the Soviets based on the reality of restored American power, with a renewed economy and credible military strength, and a clear conception of the Soviet Union as a predatory imperialist power.

Based on realism, strength and dialogue, the new policy toward the USSR projects a credible deterrent, offers peaceful competition and proposes constructive cooperation. This new posture of firmness and commitment, combined with an offer of peaceful collaboration, must have come as a shock to the Soviet leadership. After investing immense resources in their quest for permanent military superiority, they now confront the reality that their goal cannot be attained. Their efforts to use arms control talks and international peace movements to prevent the deployment of modern missiles in Europe have failed. It is not surprising that they have suspended the START and INF talks and are searching for a new way to confront this unusual American president.

THERE IS A DIALOGUE

One of the most frequently heard criticisms is the need to "restore the dialogue" with the Soviet Union. This implies that there is no dialogue. On the contrary, we are dealing with the Soviet Union both bilaterally and multilaterally in a number of forums and on a number of issues, including arms control. Examples are:

- The hot line.* Despite the harsh rhetoric of recent months, Soviet and U.S. experts have been meeting quietly to discuss ways of further improving the hot line and other communications channels between the U.S. and the USSR.
- Nuclear proliferation.* The Soviets have continued a regular pace of discussions with the United States on ways to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, an issue that is clearly in the mutual interest of both nations.
- The CDE.* The 35-nation Conference on Disarmament in Europe now is meeting for a nine-week session in Stockholm to discuss European security issues. Despite the anti-American tone of his opening address, Gromyko said the Soviets would consider the Western proposals for improved confidence building measures in Europe.
- MFBR.* After refusing in December to set a date for the



Insiders Report

Tracking the Policy Process in Washington



A Time for Bipartisanship

With the full House and one-third of the Senate up for re-election in 1984 the temptation will be great to play politics with foreign policy issues. No one would suggest that the administration should have a free hand just because it is an election year, but an overly contentious debate on the basic elements of U.S.-Soviet policy, or a major effort to make sharp cuts in the defense modernization program, could only encourage the Soviets to continue their uncooperative attitude.

Just as the Soviets seek to exploit disagreements between the United States and its NATO allies, the appearance of policy differences between the administration and the Congress encourages them to try the same thing here. Addressing the need for unity in the Western alliance, Henry Kissinger stated recently in Brussels that "The West need not panic at a period of deadlock. Its economy for all its shortcomings is more vital; its governmental structure stabler and its overall power greater. The alliance can thus face a period of holding firm with confidence — provided it preserves its unity." Another former national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, calling the present state of U.S.-Soviet relations "quite normal" in view of the natural antagonisms of our differing political systems, added that the Soviets were making some headway at "pumping up artificially an atmosphere of crisis."

There is a need for Western unity in avoiding, as Brzezinski puts it "public hysteria," or to use Kissinger's phrase, a "desperate longing for a negotiating gimmick." Evidence of desperate longings in the Congress will only further encourage Soviet intransigence.

On occasion the Congress has pulled together to demonstrate a united front on issues relating to the Soviet Union. Recent examples were the 93-0 Senate vote asking the President to report on Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements, the unanimous Senate resolution of last November calling for a ban on imports of Soviet products made by forced labor, the unanimous House resolution condemning the Soviet Union for shooting down KAL Flight 007, and the Senate resolution calling for aid to the Afghan freedom fighters that passed with 99 co-sponsors in late 1982. These are examples of congressional actions that send a clear and unambiguous signal to Moscow.

Unlike the Supreme Soviet, which approves the policies of the Soviet leadership without dissent, the Congress rarely achieves unanimity, thereby demonstrating its reflection of the diverse views of a democratic society. But a greater degree of support by the Congress for the basic elements of U.S. policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union would help move the Soviets toward a more cooperative attitude. The President's January 16 foreign policy address, setting forth the guiding principles of our approach to the Soviet Union as realism, strength and dialogue cannot be very contentious among Americans. It should be possible for Democrats and Republicans alike to reach general agreement on these basic principles of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, and to support the President's call for peaceful competition with the USSR.

THE LEADERSHIP FACTOR

Overhanging everything else is the uncertainty concerning the Soviet leadership following the death of Yuri Andropov. While Konstantin Chernenko has emerged as leader of a geriatric troika, it is difficult to predict how long this interim leadership will last.

The Soviets always have given great emphasis to collective leadership and the lengthy Brezhnev illness followed by the long Andropov disappearance has given them an opportunity to demonstrate how they can collectively keep their system operating. Despite speculation that the military or the KGB may be in the ascendancy, informed observers claim there is little hard evidence that either is the case. It is believed that the Communist Party continues to be the dominant political force in the USSR, operating through the Politburo and the party Secretariat. The four newest Politburo members all have economic or industrial backgrounds (two are electrical engineers), supporting the view that the leadership has been devoting primary attention to the country's chronic economic problems.

Considering the Soviet obsession with seniority, it is generally assumed that the Soviet Union has been operating for the past six months under a troika consisting of Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Konstantin Chernenko, who was widely considered a likely successor to Brezhnev. As the three most senior members of the Politburo (each has at least 53 years membership in the Communist Party), they are among the most powerful and well-entrenched members of the leadership. Until a new leader appears, this collective leadership of old party apparatchiks probably will continue to run things.

This does not mean that the U.S. should not try to improve relations. On the contrary, the Soviet leadership now has a rare opportunity to break with the past, to begin to establish a new relationship based on a recognition of the new reality of a stronger and more resolute America. The Soviets have tried mightily to establish strategic superiority at great cost to their economy and the well-being of their people. One estimate is that they spent half a trillion dollars on their strategic buildup, and their development of a nationwide anti-ballistic missile defense means many more billions in the years ahead.

Given the intransigence of the Soviet leadership, the likelihood of an improvement in relations is a long shot. Still, it is worth a try. Their emphasis on improving their economy, if combined with a recognition that the U.S. will not permit them to achieve strategic superiority, could encourage a move toward a new relationship. This may be the first chance in nearly 30 years for the Soviets to initiate basic changes. They have the opportunity to bury the Brezhnev/Andropov policies along with Andropov. President Reagan has offered dialogue and cooperation. If the Soviets perceive that his offer is backed by strength, unity and constancy of purpose, it could mark a new beginning.

résumption of the Vienna talks between NATO and the Warsaw Pact on the reduction of military forces in central Europe, the Soviets agreed in January to return to those talks on March 16.

- The CD.* The 40-nation Committee on Disarmament, which meets in Geneva under UN auspices, is now in session with U.S. and Soviet representatives actively participating in the discussions of both the chemical and radiological weapons working groups.
- Boundary talks.* The Soviet Union agreed in January to resume discussions with the U.S. to define the precise location of the 1867 boundary between Alaska and Siberia, to avoid possible friction over oil, mineral and fishing rights in the Bering Straits.
- The grain agreement.* The five-year U.S.-Soviet grain agreement signed last August shortly before the downing of KAL Flight 007 has survived the angry rhetoric and remains in effect.

Thus, there is a continuing dialogue with the Soviets on a number of issues. There is no shortage of channels for communication, either bilateral or multilateral, nor is there any lack of willingness on the part of the United States to engage in discussions.

SOVIET POSITION DETERIORATING

To the men in the Kremlin, the world posture of the Soviet Union must appear to be deteriorating. While the U.S. defense budget has not grown as rapidly as the Reagan Administration originally intended, there have been major improvements since the Carter years, when American power and influence reached its postwar nadir. Despite congressional reductions in the rate of increase in defense spending, the Administration is proceeding with the production and development of new weapons systems. After years of uncertainty and on-again, off-again appropriations, the B-1 bomber, the 10-warhead MX missile and the Trident II submarine missile are or soon will be in production, while research and development is proceeding on more advanced systems such as the stealth bomber and a new ballistic missile defense. The president has issued a report of Soviet violations of arms control treaties, which is likely to lead to an acceleration of our program to develop a strategic defense.

Even more disruptive to Soviet adventurism is the rapid buildup of the U.S. Navy. With the 600 ship navy moving toward reality, more than 100 ships are now under construction; the battleship *New Jersey* is operating in a combat environment off the Lebanese coast, three more battleships are being modernized and three nuclear carriers are under construction. As the number of deployable carrier battle groups increases from 12 to 15, together with four surface action groups centered around battleships, the Navy will be able to extend major complements of U.S. striking power around the globe.

The Soviets face this prospect of a significant U.S. military buildup as they review the shambles of their massive propaganda campaign to prevent the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles to Europe. For months the Soviets had warned the world of dire consequences if the deployment was not canceled. But as the missiles enter operational units, the main result seems to be apprehension on the part of the Russians' Eastern European allies. The persistent Soviet warnings⁵³ followed by the installation of additional missiles of their own

in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, have caused considerable distress in Eastern Europe, posing new problems for the Soviets in their restive sphere of control.

These are only the most recent in a series of events that have put the Soviets on the defensive. Caught in a quagmire of their own making in Afghanistan, they have failed to achieve their goals in Africa, the Middle East or Latin America. Their proxies have been evicted from Jamaica by free elections, from Grenada by U.S. power and from Surinam and Ethiopia by the local governments. The European political parties most amenable to Soviet pressure were defeated overwhelmingly by the voters of Britain, Germany and Italy. A strongly pro-Western government in Japan is increasing its defense spending.

Faced with American resolve, growing U.S. military and economic strength, and the continued unity of the Western alliance, the Soviets have realized no foreign policy or military successes, unless the continued uneasy subjugation of the Polish people can be called a success, since the Reagan Administration came to office.

CONCLUSION

It is ironic that American success and growing Soviet failure are seen by some as a problem and a danger. We have become so inured to Soviet advances that it requires an adjustment in our thinking to realize that America is now leading the tide of events and the Soviet Union is reacting to them. Yet a hallmark of the Soviet system has been its constancy of purpose, while we have all too often wavered in our resolve. The challenge for the year ahead is for America to remain steady, to continue the military renewal that has been started, to reject Soviet threats and efforts at intimidation, and to devote the necessary resources to the rapid development of modern weapons systems such as a strategic defense for North America, that will assure our security and that of the free world in the coming decades.

The Soviets are determined to divide the Western alliance. Their state-controlled propaganda machine has now been turned from its effort to stop the NATO missile deployments to a new focus on a greater challenge—to divide Europe from America. Every statement by the Soviet leadership, and the outpourings of *TASS* and *Pravda*, appear designed for this purpose. Gromyko's harsh attacks on the U.S. are warnings to the Europeans. And when Soviet belligerence brings forth calls for appeasement, either from Europe or from within America, our adversaries are encouraged to redouble their efforts. While no one is attracted to the Soviet system for its democratic ideals, many fear Soviet power and are tempted to make concessions to it.

The U.S. stands ready to return at any time to the START and INF talks, but it must be from a position of tough-minded reality. The protection of U.S. security interests requires simpler and less ambiguous agreements, with ironclad verification provisions and a pre-determined U.S. compliance policy that is understood and agreed upon within the government, as a prerequisite of any new treaty with the Soviets.

Despite the potential divisiveness of the presidential and congressional election campaigns, we must not permit our relations with the Soviets, or our basic national security policies, to become partisan political issues this election year. Most Americans can agree on that, even though they may disagree on the details of those policies. Only if we demonstrate unity and constancy of purpose, both here at home and within the Western alliance, will the Soviets accept the new reality of relations with a strong and resolute America.



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New Leadership Makes Summit Seem Doubtful

Associated Press

The Soviet leadership change has left the United States in doubt about whether Moscow wants a summit meeting this year between President Reagan and Soviet chief Konstantin U. Chernenko, a top State Department official said yesterday.

Richard R. Burt, assistant secretary of state for European affairs, told a congressional panel that the Reagan administration has yet to notice any encouraging moves from the Soviet Union other than "general statements" since the death of President Yuri V. Andropov.

"We don't have any evidence that they're prepared for a genuine improvement in the relationship that would require them to meet us half-way," Burt told the House Foreign Affairs Committee's subcommittee on Europe.

But, he said, "if the Soviets mean what they say" there is hope for progress. "We are ready certainly on our part to engage the Soviets in real dialogue on all the issues."

The administration continues to insist that any summit conference be carefully prepared, he said. "We are not interested in a cosmetic or an atmospheric meeting. We want a meeting that can produce something," Burt said. "The Soviet view, of course, on the summit is very unclear at the current time because of the new leader."

Wash Post
21 Mar 84

Next likely Soviet signal in East-West ties: chemical weapon talks

By Elizabeth Pond

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Vienna

The next Soviet signal in East-West relations could come at the Geneva talks on banning chemical weapons. Or it could come in bilateral superpower relations.

It is unlikely to materialize at the Vienna troop reduction talks, however.

This seems to be the consensus of a number of allied diplomats close to the ongoing American, British, and West German attempt to work out a common modification of the NATO proposal of 1982. Such a modification could not be wrestled out in time for the March 16 reopening of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks.

The sources believe that Western differences can be resolved in the next few weeks — with West Germany scaling down its wish for a public demonstration of the West's readiness to compromise, and with the United States and Britain trimming their aversion to good-will gestures before end goals have been agreed on. The diplomats do not really expect, however, that any of the modified Western approaches now under consideration would elicit a major Soviet response.

The decade-old MBFR talks have in any case always been somewhat peripheral to the main superpower concerns of nuclear balance and détente. Moscow's sudden willingness last January to resume the Vienna talks was an exception; it was important as the first step back from Soviet suspension of nuclear and conventional arms control negotiations in late 1983 in reaction to NATO's new deployment of Euromissiles.

The subsequent death of Soviet party secretary Yuri Andropov and the succession of Konstantin Chernenko created a new opportunity for East-West, signaling a changed situation. But by then some direct political dialogue between the superpowers had been restarted and the Geneva talks on banning chemical weapons looked more promising as a medium for East-West communication. The MBFR talks were no longer needed as a surrogate for the nonexistent nuclear talks and a reassurance for public opinion.

Chemical weapons talks continue to be attractive to the Soviets partly because of their political ambiguity. The Soviet initiative tabled this year conveys a message of reasonableness to the West. At the same time, however, it holds the potential

of arousing anti-military passions in the future among West Germans in the same way that nuclear weapons issues did last year. It also could head off imminent American upgrading of chemical capability as the US reacts to the extensive Soviet chemical capability in Europe.

Chemical arms control — which is simpler than nuclear arms control or probably even European troops reductions — also holds out the possibility of an eventual high-level superpower meeting if enough progress is made.

The broader resumption of the superpower dialogue — along with President Reagan's conciliatory speech of Jan. 16 and Chernenko's toning down of Soviet anti-American rhetoric — provides another major channel for private and public East-West communication.

The already slim Soviet incentive for a summit prior to the US presidential election (if Reagan looked like a shoo-in) is fading as the November election begins to look somewhat more open. But any post-election summit, if desired, could be arranged directly at this point without requiring prior signaling in other form.

All this suggests that the MBFR talks will revert to their more limited technical function of trying to stabilize troop confrontations in Central Europe, without bearing any additional symbolic burden.

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US seeking sign Soviets want better relations

20 The Boston Sunday Globe March 11, 1984

By William Beecher
Globe Staff

WASHINGTON - The Administration hopes to determine within the next month or two if the new Soviet leadership will take concrete actions to improve relations significantly.

If quiet diplomatic explorations now under way show enough promise, top officials say, there is a possibility of a meeting between Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in the early summer, to be followed by a summit between President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Konstantin U. Chernenko in late summer.

"The President does not want a summit just to be having a summit," one top planner said. "But if something could be solved at the summit or at least if progress could be made, that would meet our criteria."

Senior officials say progress could come on either nuclear arms control or on a series of smaller issues that are being discussed.

Against the possibility the Russians might suddenly take up the United States on its expressed willingness to offer more flexible positions on strategic arms reductions, the White House twice last week held meetings of the Senior Arms Control Policy Group to consider options worked up over the last several months within the bureaucracy.

Ranking planners say the United States would prefer that if a

summit is held it should aim at achieving a political decision on a common formula for resuming Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in Geneva.

They say, however, that if Moscow is reluctant to resume those negotiations - having made such a fuss about walking out of Geneva after the deployment of Pershing 2 and cruise missiles in Europe - the United States would be willing to consider some other forum.

Lesser issues

In the event the Soviet Union doesn't want to resume nuclear arms talks until after the presidential election, the Administration is prepared for a summit aimed at agreeing on a package of lesser issues.

Among those already being explored with the Soviet Union:

- An upgrade in the hot line to enable encrypted maps and documents to be transmitted between Washington and Moscow in a crisis. At present only telegraphic messages may be sent

- A new cultural and educational exchange agreement significantly increasing visits between the two nations.

- Improved navigational aids in Soviet Asia to decrease the chances of another incident such as the one in which a Korean airliner was shot down last September.

- A consular agreement enabling the Russians to open a consulate in New York and the United States one in Kiev, and improved procedures whereby each country would inform the other if any of their nationals get into trouble while traveling.

- Agreement on on-site inspection not only of the destruction of chemical warfare weapons, but also of suspected production facilities and storage sites. The United States will soon offer a treaty to ban lethal chemical weapons.

- Agreement to modify draft treaties on a threshold test ban and peaceful nuclear explosions to permit on-site inspection of nuclear detonations. The new treaties would be submitted to the Senate for ratification.

- Agreement on some of the so-called confidence-building measures being considered in talks in Stockholm on issues such as advance notification of major military exercises.

"We're engaging them in a dialogue on all these things, or at least proposing to," one senior official said. "That's why I think it'll take a couple of months before we can make a judgment."

Administration officials say they are mildly encouraged about the possibility for improved relations since the ascension of Chernenko as general secretary of the Communist Party and head of the Soviet Defense Council.

They say the calling of a meeting of the Supreme Soviet, or parliament, for April 11 - more than a month early - may be a sign that Chernenko is about to get the third hat of leadership, that of the presidency. Actually the title is chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

Assuming the presidency would indicate that Chernenko is clearly in charge. It took Yuri Andropov seven months until he got his third hat of leadership.

There are several analysts give for thinking Chernenko may, for personal and policy reasons, want both a summit and improved relations.

First it would improve Chernenko's image and prestige if he met as chief of state with the American president and took steps seen as moving back toward some sort of detente relationship - which he keeps saying he wants.

Even in his own society, he is seen as a bag carrier for Leonid Brezhnev and a man who cannot deliver a speech without slurring his words and sometimes losing his place and skipping whole passages. "Face is very important to the Russians," one analyst notes.

A substantive and successful summit meeting would enhance his standing as a leader. It would do the same thing for Reagan, not an unimportant consideration in his re-election bid.

But beyond the personal factor, American analysts say the Soviet Union could use what one official calls "a breathing space."

Economic factor

To improve its economy, the Soviet Union must provide more consumer goods as incentives for factory workers and farmers to work harder. Decreased defense spending resulting from arms control agreements would help.

Improved relations would permit the purchase of more automated equipment from the West to improve productivity.

Particularly if it appears Reagan will be re-elected, the Soviets can expect continued high spending on defense generally and on new strategic arms, providing a major challenge for Soviet technology. Arms control agreements could constrain the technological challenge, by constraining the forces of both sides.

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